Pervasion of what? : techno–human ecologies and their ubiquitous spirits. by Coeckelbergh, M.J.K.
1 23
AI & SOCIETY
Journal of Knowledge, Culture and
Communication
 
ISSN 0951-5666
 
AI & Soc
DOI 10.1007/s00146-012-0418-y
Pervasion of what? Techno–human
ecologies and their ubiquitous spirits
Mark Coeckelbergh
1 23
Your article is published under the Creative
Commons Attribution license which allows
users to read, copy, distribute and make
derivative works, as long as the author of
the original work is cited. You may self-
archive this article on your own website, an
institutional repository or funder’s repository
and make it publicly available immediately.
25TH ANNIVERSARY VOLUME
A FAUSTIAN EXCHANGE: WHAT IS TO BE HUMAN IN THE ERA OF UBIQUITOUS TECHNOLOGY?
Pervasion of what? Techno–human ecologies and their ubiquitous
spirits
Mark Coeckelbergh
Received: 15 September 2011 / Accepted: 29 March 2012
 The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Are the robots coming? Is the singularity near?
Will we be dominated by technology? The usual response
to ethical issues raised by pervasive and ubiquitous tech-
nologies assumes a philosophical anthropology centered on
existential autonomy and agency, a dualistic ontology
separating humans from technology and the natural from
the artificial, and a post-monotheistic dualist and creational
spirituality. This paper explores an alternative, less modern
vision of the ‘‘technological’’ future based on different
assumptions: a ‘‘deep relational’’ view of human being and
self, an ecological view of human–technology relations,
and ‘‘ubiquitous’’ spirituality. Moving beyond an ethics of
fear and control, it is argued that technology is part of a
lived and active whole that is at the same time human,
technological, social, and spiritual. Influenced by ecologi-
cal and Eastern thinking, it is concluded that an ethics of
technology understood as a relational ethics of life asks us
to adapt and grow within this multi-faced ecology, which is
currently—but not necessarily—pervaded by hyper-indi-
vidualist modernity and its ego-boosting technologies of
the self. This growth is only possible by relating to, and
learning from, other cultures and from their specific way of
pervading and being pervaded.
Keywords Pervasive technology  Ubiquitous technology 
Artificial intelligence  Ethics  Autonomy  Self  Ecology 
Phenomenology  Spirituality  Buddhism  Taoism 
Confucianism
1 Introduction
Contemporary information and communication technolo-
gies open up wonderful possibilities previous generations
could hardly have imagined. In many domains of human
activity, they give us new experiences and allow us to do
new things. This seems true for so-called pervasive and
ubiquitous technologies, which integrate networked elec-
tronic devices in everyday objects and everyday life.
Artifacts such as mobile phones and GPS navigation
devices pervade many of our activities. The internet itself
is perhaps the greatest ‘‘pervader’’. And we tend to wel-
come them. We wish to be part of the networks. We yearn
to connect and to remain connected. Who would want to
return to the barren wastelands of permanent off-line
existence? Who could reasonably want such a suicide?
However, when we reflect upon these changes and
realize how ‘‘pervasive’’ these technologies are in a
broader sense, indeed if we see how much they change the
way we lead our lives, we may also become deeply con-
cerned about the problems raised by these pervasive tech-
nologies and, more generally, we may worry about the
darker sides of what is sometimes called the ‘‘information
age’’. We may sense that perhaps we have lost something
on the road to progress. Then initial enthusiasm might be
replaced by fear: the fear that (artificially intelligent)
technology ‘‘takes over’’, that it gets ‘‘out of control’’, that
there is no room for the human in the machine, that the
robots are coming and that the singularity is near, that we
are crushed by a system that is blind to human ethical and
existential concerns, that the machine will invade us and
that we will become machines in a silicon world. After
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud, and postmodernism, it seems
that the human ego is now given a final and deathly blow
by technology—at best a mercy killing that ends the
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torments of this most miserable of all creatures, at worst an
event even the victim does not remotely care about. Then,
we would have arrived at a point when, as Walter Benja-
min wrote, mankind’s ‘‘self-alienation has reached such a
degree that it can experience its own destruction as an
esthetic pleasure of the first order’’ (Benjamin 1936,
p. 242). Can we avoid this techno-fascism, this summit of
alienation and de-humanization?
Fear of technology and of losing control is not new; it is
related to a well-known current in the Western culture,
sometimes referred to as the ‘‘Frankenstein syndrome’’.
Consider the ancient Greek myths of Prometheus, who
stole fire from the gods and gave it to mortals, for which he
was heavily punished by Zeus, or the story of Icarus, who
made wings of wax but flew near to the sun, fell down, and
died. In modern interpretations of these myths, technology
is linked to the ancient Greek concept of hubris: we are
arrogant if we think that we can control the world and
control the technology; we cannot and we will pay for our
arrogance. In modern times, we find the story of the sor-
cerer’s apprentice (see e.g., Goethe’s poem Der Zauber-
lehrling), who enchants a broom but then loses control.
There is also the legend of Faust who, in his pursuit of
pleasure and knowledge, sells his soul to the devil. He
becomes eternally damned.1 And of course, there is the
famous story of Frankenstein’s monster. Marry Shelley’s
19th century novel, which, significantly enough, is subtitled
‘‘The Modern Prometheus’’, tells the story of Victor Fran-
kenstein who created an artificial man, but then the ‘‘monster’’
turns against him. The animation of death matter, the creation
of artificial life and intelligence, is punished.2
Most philosophers of technology have also been pessi-
mistic about technological progress and in particular about
modern technology. After the scientific and technological
optimism of early modernists like Bacon and Descartes and
of many Enlightenment thinkers, philosophers such as
Heidegger, Jonas, Ellul, and Marcuse focused on the dark
side of technology and of technological society. In spite of
the differences in approach between these thinkers, they
shared the view that modern technology, which was sup-
posed to improve our lives, turned out to be a threatening
and alienating force. The ‘‘New Atlantis’’ (Bacon 1626)
proved to be less hospitable than foreseen. Technology,
which was conceived as something that could help
humanity, came to be seen as a threat to humanity and to
society. We became cogs in the machine and mindless
consumers. Our autonomy was violated by technology.
Moreover, technology was also seen as a threat to spiritu-
ality. Weber argued that rationalization has also disen-
chanted the world (Weber 1919). In a world ruled by
science and technology, it seemed there is no longer room
for religion or spirituality. In modernity, we became our
own gods by means of technology, but then were overruled
by our own inventions. The human quest for knowledge
and power is being punished; the story of human hubris is
now coming to an end.
Viewed in this light, contemporary information and
communication technologies—and pervasive technologies
in particular—seem to aggravate our sad predicament. We
invented the World Wide Web to liberate and help us, but
we get trapped in our own creation and become the victim
of large corporate and governmental spiders, which
squeeze information out of us in order to make profit or to
gain more power. We created e-mail to communicate fas-
ter, but now we have to work faster and harder. We
invented mobile phones to gain more freedom and auton-
omy, but now we are tracked and monitored; we are sup-
posed to be available 24 h. In late modernity, Big Brother
did not leave the scene, but became ubiquitous. We might
fear that soon the network will even colonize the things we
never knew had anything to do with information technol-
ogy. It seems that the Internet of things will be the final
defeat of human autonomy. Information technology will
surround us and pervade us. They will be very small. They
will be intelligent. They will be in us. We will be the
system. Singularity will be realized at last.
Of course, this picture of contemporary technology is far
too one-sided; it can and must be challenged. Perhaps we
can retain some control over these technologies; perhaps
our capacity of agency is not entirely eroded; perhaps
pervasion is not total. We might even use the very same
technologies to empower us, to exercise more agency; this
is already happening. This is the other, more positive side
of the story of technological progress. However, this paper
has a different purpose. Both sides share the assumption
that human agency and autonomy are to be protected and to
be promoted. This paper asks if, when in our response to
problems with contemporary information technologies—
‘‘pervasive’’ and others—we put so much emphasis on
agency and autonomy, we are asking the right kind of
questions. In particular, it examines the philosophical–
anthropological, ontological, and spiritual assumptions
(broadly construed) that underlie the discussion and
explores a view based on different assumptions. Thus, this
paper is concerned with a broader meaning of ‘‘pervasion’’
than the one implied in present-day ‘‘pervasive’’ technol-
ogies; with its discussion it aims to open up a different
discursive space where different questions can be asked
and different visions of the technological future can
emerge.
1 See also Goethe’s play, although here Faust seeks transcendent
knowledge and in the end he goes to heaven.
2 Note that the monster mourns over the body of his creator. It seems
that the only thing we can hope for is that the intelligent artificial
beings we will create, will also mourn the death of humanity.
AI & Soc
123
2 The Frankensteinian problem and its assumptions
The usual response to ethical issues raised by pervasive and
ubiquitous technologies assumes a philosophical anthro-
pology centered on autonomy and agency. Psychologically,
what is at stake is the defense of the borders of the human
against potential invasions by technology. The human is a
castle that must be protected. We erect walls and dig dit-
ches. The human is sharply divided from the non-human;
technology is seen as non-human. It can be used, but it
remains and has to remain something alien. It is an
instrument to realize human purposes, but the means
(technology) and the end (the human) should be carefully
kept separate. In philosophical jargon, we have to make
sure that the subject does not become an object. It is
emphasized that we are not things. As Sartre wrote, we are
subjects and not ‘‘a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauli-
flower’’ (Sartre 1946). If he were alive today, he might
write, ‘‘we are subjects and not a kind of mobile electronic
device; we are not an iPad.’’ According to the modern
view, there is a separation between me (the subject) and the
world (natural and artificial objects) and we have to
maintain that separation. Alienation is conceptualized as
the invasion of the subject by the object – the colonization
of the lifeworld by the system (Habermas 1984–1987).3
Ubiquitous technology seems to imply a kind of objectifi-
cation: technology no longer appears as tools we use or
through which we express our freedom and potentiality as
human beings who wish to be subjects (this is the positive
meaning of objectification we can find in Marx, see e.g., his
Comments on James Mill), but rather technology appears as
something alien that makes us alien as well: it pervades us
and threatens to turn us into objects, we are in danger of
becoming ‘‘mere things’’. Then, technology implies the
violation and death of subjectivity rather than its realiza-
tion. Remaining human means protecting the purity of your
subjectivity, which should remain unpenetrated by the
anything or anyone. The protection of humanity is a matter
of ontological hygiene and chastity (Lat. castus means
‘‘pure’’). Autonomy means protecting your castle from
invasion: invasion by other people, but also invasion by the
material. Subject and object must remain separated. As
Berlin put it in his famous article ‘‘Two Concepts of
Liberty’’:
‘‘I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself,
not on external forces of whatever kind. (…) I wish to
be a subject, not an object; (…) I wish to be some-
body, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being
decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by
external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or
an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human
role (…)’’ (Berlin 1958, p. 203).
This definition of autonomy reflects the assumption that
to become human is to take distance from the natural and
the material, to pull yourself out of the dust and dirt of the
earth. Human dignity4 is achieved by cutting off your ties
with the beasts and by elevating yourself above matter;
violation of human integrity is interpreted as a beastly and
monstrous act, a transgression of the ontological and moral
boundaries. Nothing merely earthly and beastly should be
made human, and nothing human should be made earthly
and beastly. The moral imperative is to let nothing alien
invade your humanity, that is, your subjectivity. If you use
technology, make sure it remains a mere tool, a mere thing.
Use it for your purposes, but do not let it become the
purpose.
In the West, the spirituality that goes with this view is
rooted in monotheist creational thinking,5 which sets up a
sharp divide between (the one) God and His creation. In
contrast to nature relations, the earth is seen as a non-
spiritual place, a stage on which the creatures perform their
lives, but to which their spirituality is not intrinsically
related. Spirit belongs to the one God, and spirituality
means to connect to God’s spirit, to receive His grace.
There is no spirit in the natural and the material world.
Keeping your spiritual purity means to wash off the dirt of
the earth. Long before Weber wrote about disenchantment,
the world was already disenchanted by monotheism—or at
least there was already the idea of a non-spiritual earthly
world.6 Moreover, the creator is kept separate from the
creatures. In modern ‘‘secular’’ culture, the assumption that
there is a strict divide between the creator (spiritual) and
the created (non-spiritual) is maintained, but then with
humans in the position of the creator. We create artifacts,
but maintain a strict distinction between human creator
(human dignity, human subjectivity, human ends, etc.) and
the created (mere things, instruments, means, etc.). If
anyone or anything crosses this divide, we have a
3 Note that this positive meaning of alienation as objectification is
different from Marx’s notion of alienation, which is about the
alienation of the worker from his product, his work, his essence, and
from others under capitalist conditions (see the Economic and
Philiosophic Manuscripts of 1844)—although it might be interesting
to explore potential links between the two (alienation from your
essence as a human being might be a good starting point). And of
course, Habermas’s work is influenced by Marx.
4 There are other, more relational views of human dignity, also in the
West, but they seldom include our relation to technology or
materiality. (see footnote 7).
5 Note, however, that some other forms of religion—ancient or
modern—may also be in line with it, for example, if and to the extent
that they hold that only humans and gods are spiritual beings.
6 The disenchantment thesis has been (rightly) criticized by several
authors; I will challenge this thesis in the next section.
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‘‘monster.’’ Things—natural and artificial—are not sup-
posed to touch the human center of value, meaning, and
creational (quasi-) spirituality. Natural and artificial entities
belong to the domain of facts, but this world has to be kept
separated from the realm of values. The imperative for
things is: Thou shalt not invade the castle of value, the
realm of normativity, the domain of human value, the
kingdom of ends. If there is spirit at all, it belongs to
the human, and things have value only insofar as they are
related to the original source. When craftsmanship is
concerned, things may still have an ‘‘aura’’ derived from
the craftsman’s spirit, but, as Benjamin lamented, in the
age of mechanical reproduction this aura is lost (Benjamin
1936). Just as modern ‘‘mass men’’ have been alienated
from their divine creator, modern ‘‘mass products’’ have
been orphaned from their human creator.
In the age of information technology, this alienation
seems to only increase, since there is no longer an artifact.
And who is the maker? There are only bits of ‘‘informa-
tion’’, and their source is unclear. There are nodes in the
network, but they are created by no one and by everyone.
No spirituality, not even a spiritual aura, can be attached to
these fluid elements, the metaphysical status of which is
entirely unclear. It therefore seems best that we humans use
it for our purposes, but maintain our ontological purity as
subjects. Whatever information is, it is not human. Make
sure that you guard your castle: they are everywhere.
Ubiquitous technology is already knocking on the gates.
Defend yourself and your dignity against others and against
the objects that try to invade your space. Strengthen your
philosophical firewalls against the monsters that try to
cross the distinctions. Perhaps it is already too late.
Thus, setting up what we may call the Faustian problem—
gaining and maintaining human agency and autonomy in a
technological world that threatens to alienate us—depends on
what we may call these modern ‘‘works of purification’’
(Latour 1993). Only if we assume a dualist anthropology,
ontology, and spirituality, can we define the problem in this
way. This becomes clearer if we explore an alternative view of
the relation between humans and technology.
3 An alternative view: techno–human ecologies
and their spirits
The usual view of alienation and pervasion assumes that
human beings interact with their environment, but are
basically separated from it. There is a ‘‘relation’’ between
human and environment, between subject and object, but
this is a ‘‘weak’’ kind of relationality, since there remains a
(normatively significant) gap between the two. If we
assume a ‘‘strong’’ relational or ‘‘deep’’ relational view of
the human, however, we get a very different problem
formulation. Let us start from humans who are already
connected to, and engaged in, their environment. In Wes-
tern philosophy, such a view is suggested by phenomeno-
logical and ecological approaches.7 Heidegger used the
term ‘‘being-in-the-world’’ for this existential relationality
(Heidegger 1927) to criticize the subject/object split in the
Western tradition. We are involved beings—there is no
Cartesian split between consciousness and world, between
mind and matter. Subject and object are strongly related.
Similarly, ecology suggests that what we are dependent on
our relations to the environment (see e.g., Callicott 1986).
In Buddhism, Taoism, and (to some extent) Confucianism,
we also find a ‘‘deep relational’’ view of human being, a view
which has fruitfully influenced Western thinkers. For exam-
ple, the ‘‘embodied cognition’’ approach is inspired not only
by the Western phenomenological tradition (e.g., Merleau-
Ponty), but also by Confucianist, Taoist, and Buddhist thought
(Varela et al. 1991, 1999). For Buddhists, the duality self/
world or subject/object is an illusion. Moreover, they reject the
Hinduism notion of the true self. We do not ‘have’ a self. In
this sense, the self is ‘‘empty’’ or non-existent (doctrine of
‘‘no-self’’). We are not, we become, humans and everything
else ‘are’ becoming. And although Taoism does not deny the
ontological reality of the self, it recommends selflessness in
the sense of leading a life in harmony with nature and society
(Ho 1995). Confucianism also emphasizes relationships with
(human) others and with the collective.
With regard to the relation between humans and tech-
nology, this ‘‘deep relational’’ approach to human being
implies recognizing that we are always already related to
technology as we act with things and live with things.
Technology is not an external instrument, but is part of
what we are and what we do. There is mutual pervasion,
change, adaptation, and life. Without pervasion, without
relationality, there is not real change; there is only death. If
the self is relational, then there is no subject separate from
the object. Human being implies subjects being already
pervaded (and constituted) by ‘‘objects’’—in a much
stronger or deeper sense than in Marx. There is no longer
7 Note that there are other approaches within Western philosophy that
may also inspire more relational and non-Cartesian thinking. For
example, philosophers from the neo-Aristotelian tradition have
emphasized the social and vulnerable nature of human being. For
example, Nussbaum’s version of the Capability Approach is partly
based on the recognition that human dignity is grounded into our
vulnerability, that human good crucially depends on others and that
animals also have dignity (e.g., Nussbaum 2006, 2011). And
MacIntyre has argued that vulnerability and dependency are central
to human life and virtue, and that as embodied beings, we have much
in common with animals (MacIntyre 1999). However, these views do
not radically question dualist views of self and human being and
remain non-relational when it comes to their assumptions about the
relations between humans and technology (I argue for a more
relational interpretation and development of Nussbaum’s approach
elsewhere).
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the assumption of a human essence. Self-development is
intrinsically related to change in the world. This means that
we can no longer be ‘‘pervaded’’ in an existentially relevant
sense. What would be pervaded? In this view, there was
never a pure state in the first place, no agent or self that is
prior to ‘‘interaction’’. Being alive is being related. We
need an epistemology and ontology of breathing here: we
are in continuous touch with the world; we are in the world
as changing and exchanging beings. This is how we gain
knowledge and this is how we live.
Moreover, phenomenological ecology implies not only the
death of the autonomous subject, but also the death of the
autonomous object. There is no permanent, fixed ontological
order. There are no ‘‘mere’’ objects or ‘‘mere’’ means. There
are no artifacts apart from their relations to their environment,
and there is no thing-in-itself (to use a famous Kantian term).
With regard to the human–technology relation, we must
question isolationist assumptions with regard to the meaning
of the terms ‘‘human’’ and ‘‘technology’’: there are techno–
human ecologies, in which ‘‘things’’ and ‘‘humans’’ are
interdependent in a strong sense: they cannot exist without one
another. For humans, this ‘‘deep relationality’’ implies that we
do not ‘have’ an environment but are environmental by nature.
In this sense, the modern, largely Cartesian philosophical
project is a suicidal project: if we disconnect ourselves from
the world, create a split between subject and object, we end our
lives, rip apart the connection we are.
Spiritually, these non-dualistic views imply that spirit is
not the possession of the One, or given by the One, as
monotheism supposed, and they question the sharp sepa-
ration of appearance and reality inherent in Platonism. To
start with the latter, Platonism is notoriously dualistic, and
insofar as the Western philosophical tradition is influenced
by Platonic thinking, it inherits this dualism. To question
this tradition means to explore ‘‘non-Platonic’’ views
in philosophy8 and religion. Non-dualistic views of
spirituality do not presuppose an ontological or spiritual
gap between ‘‘higher’’ and ‘‘lower’’, ‘‘spiritual’’ and
‘‘material’’, ‘‘mind’’ and ‘‘matter’’. Rather, spirituality
itself becomes ‘‘ubiquitous’’: spirit is everywhere—or
indeed nowhere (as Eastern thinkers know, on these mat-
ters, we can only speak paradoxically). However, this view
does not only resemble some influential strands in Eastern
thinking, but is also close to ‘‘polytheistic’’ nature religions
that preceded Western monotheism and preceded Eastern
‘‘religions’’, for example ‘‘pagan’’ (that is, non-Christian)
religion in Western Europe and Shintoism in Japan. Both
Western paganism and Shintoism believe that there are
spirits and gods in various places and objects. Spirit does
not belong to one god or to one kind of beings (the children
of the one god) but is ‘‘ubiquitous’’ and pervasive and not
traceable back to one source. Soul is everywhere or can be
everywhere, spread throughout the world and ‘in’ the
world, rather than a priori disconnected from it.
This view seems to commend forms of immanent spir-
ituality rather than transcendent spirituality.9 Moreover,
such spirituality also implies that we must question the
story of ‘‘disenchantment’’ (Weber 1919), inspired by non-
dualistic approaches; we must deny that our world is
(necessarily) a place of alienation and open up to different
ways of experiencing the world. If we do so, we may
replenish the world with meaning and value, or rather, from
this perspective, we may come to experience it as always
having been full of meaning and value.10
Similarly, according to this view, the social is not
defined in a way that disconnects it from the larger, living
natural–artificial whole. Society is already technological,
and technology is already social. Society is not constructed
by pre-social and de-material individuals, but grows out of,
and with, the natural and the material. The social is neither
separated from technology nor from nature. In lived
experience and practice, in existence-in-development, all
modern categories merge and provide the relational ground
for human flourishing.11
For ethics of technology, these alternative anthropolo-
gies, ontologies, spiritualities, and sociologies imply that
we must replace the ethics of control and autonomy by an
ethics of life, which is concerned not with protecting the
boundaries of the self and the human against invasion and
pervasion by technology, but with shaping and re-shaping
the continuously changing human–technology relations.
8 Criticism of the Platonic strand in the Western philosophical
tradition (and indeed of monotheism) has become rather common by
now—to the point of becoming a cliche´—but it remains an interesting
direction of thought for those who wish to explore more ‘earthly’
views of the world, of spirituality, of human beings, and of
technology (but still different from the scientific world view). For
example, Onfray has criticized the monotheist religions and the
Western philosophical project for their Platonism. In his Atheist
Manifesto, he writes that monotheists turned to Plato in order to focus
on the eternal and the immortal; they ‘‘conceive of the earthly city
only in terms of the heavenly city’, thus creating a gap between
earthly and heavenly concerns that became ‘an ontological wound
impossible to close.’’ (Onfray 2005, p. 96) He has defended an anti-
Platonic approach that is to get us closer to the earth, to matter, to the
body, and to the senses. (Note, however, that he also defends hedonist
and (post) anarchist versions of this view, which are not necessarily
implied in the broader anti-Platonic stance he proposed. Moreover,
the ideas I explore in this paper need not necessarily be a-theist, and
some interpretations of monotheist spirituality might be closer to ‘the
earth’ than Onfray suggests.).
9 Note, however, that neither immanent nor transcendent spirituality
exists in ‘pure’ form; most religions are a mixture of both.
10 For arguments against disenchantment theory, see for example,
Bennett (2001) and Szerszynski (2005). See also my discussion of the
relation between spirituality and technology in Coeckelbergh 2010.
11 Note also that in light of the view of spirituality articulated above,
the social is not only material but also spiritual. The history of society
is also the history of the sacred (see also, Szerszynski 2005).
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The question is not, ‘‘Do we let this technological artifact
enter our lives’’ but ‘‘Is this artifact contributing to a good
way of relating to our environment?’’ Is this artifact a good
fertilizer for the growth of good, for human and non-human
flourishing? Such an ‘‘environmental’’ ethics requires some
kind of ‘‘agency,’’ perhaps, but then not understood in
terms of the thoughts (or the ‘‘mental’’, e.g., intentions) and
actions of a subject divided from objects, but rather
holistically and in terms of adaptation and growth. In
ethical action, the mental and the material merge, there is
human/technological and human/non-human flourishing.
This kind of ethics does not take away the possibility to
be critical about new technologies and does not take away
the possibility of (understanding and justifying) fear of
particular technologies. We may come to experience that
some technologies we are involved with produce less
flourishing. However, what is to be feared here, then, is not
that the technology in question ‘‘takes over’’ (because
philosophically speaking there is nothing separate to take
over), but that the technology threatens life, produces
death—with death understood as the absence of connection
and change, indeed alienation. Then alienation is neither
the pervasion of the self by something alien nor, as in
Marx, a distance between worker and product (see e.g., the
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1944), but the
denial of the deeper existential and dynamic relationality
implied in human being and the active attempt to discon-
nect rather than link.
Thus, this approach to human being and to technology
does not exclude normative evaluation of technologies, on
the contrary. If anything or anyone fosters and reinforces
ways of thinking and doing that disconnect us from our
environment broadly conceived, that is, if it attempts to
violate and annihilate relations—relations of all kinds, in
dualist language, ‘‘human–human’’, ‘‘human–natural’’,
‘‘human–artificial’’, ‘‘natural–natural’’, etc.—then this is
bad ethically speaking. If there is anything we must fear, it
is that kind of ‘‘alienation’’ (Note, however, that this kind
of ethics does not necessarily require a heuristic of fear:
even the fear of death can be overcome according to
Taoists—if life and death both belong to Tao, if they are
one, then fear ceases).
With regard to information technology, for example, this
kind of ethics implies that if flows of information and
communication become ubiquitous and pervasive, ‘‘mix-
ing’’ themselves with the objects of our ‘‘lifeworld’’, this is
not necessarily problematic. The modern illusion that this
‘‘lifeworld’’ was separated from ‘‘the system’’ in the first
place and the illusion of the possibility of full control are
themselves problematic. However, as said if certain
‘‘technological’’ developments were to promote human
living in a way that leads to isolation from our social,
natural, and artificial environment, that undermine the
living ecological whole, then such growth would not lead
to flourishing and can rightly be called ‘‘bad’’. Note,
however, that usually ‘‘technological’’ developments
(which are at the same time social and human develop-
ments) are ethically ambiguous. For example, the World
Wide Web has helped us to become more interconnected,
both with each other and perhaps also with the (global)
‘‘natural’’ world. At the same time, however, it also pro-
vides a platform for self-centered pursuits that seek to
expand power and control of individuals at the expense of
human and non-human others, rather than strengthening
relations.
Viewing from this perspective, if there is a problem of
hubris at all, it is not that technology may turn against us
and control us, whereas we should be in control. The
problem of modern hubris is that we think we can be
disconnected and should be disconnected, that we are and
should become psychologically, socially, and ontologically
autonomous individuals, separated our social–natural–
artificial environment. This descriptive and normative
solipsism is the hubris inherent in modern dualistic think-
ing. But, as Heidegger also warned us, we should not
entertain the illusion that we can simply get rid of this way
of thinking. Let me explain this.
4 Modernity’s pervasiveness, artificial intelligence,
and the growth of cultural change
In his later philosophy, Heidegger criticizes the view that
technology is a means to an end (Heidegger 1954) and
suggests that the very attempt to control technology still
belongs to the modern technological way of thinking and
excludes other ways of thinking. Instead of trying to con-
trol, he says that we have to let go (Heidegger uses the term
Gelassenheit, Heidegger 1999). This means that we have to
wait for change to happen. Truth is a revealing and an
unfolding; although it does not happen without humans, it
does not happen exclusively through humans, and we may
never see the ultimate truth. Many stars in the nocturnal
sky have long since died; who can say with certainty what
is really happening now? Perhaps modern thinking is dying
or has already died. Yet at the same time, in our current
experience it shines forth or appears to shine forth now for
us and pervades our thinking and doings. We cannot fun-
damentally, radically, and quickly change this situation by
means of ‘‘meta-technology’’. Of course, we can make and
enforce regulations, laws, etc., to try to make (the use of)
technology more ‘‘ethical’’; like technology, these are
means of exercising control. But if we presuppose that we
can control the world in this way, our meta-technology
itself is also a modern technological way of thinking; it is
part of the problem rather than its remedy.
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Moreover, if everything is inter-dependent in a strong
sense, we cannot change our thinking and ‘‘re-enchant’’ the
world by a mere act of will. If our way of thinking—
including the illusion that the world is disenchanted—can
change at all, it cannot change because we want it to
change. Our way of thinking and doing has already chan-
ged human being and the world we are entangled with. To
think that we could ‘‘switch’’ to a different thinking and
spirituality would assume the very modern kind of thinking
it seeks to replace; it is only by supposing that the world is
an empty canvas on which we inscribe our meaning and
our values, that we could even consider the possibility that
the world might be ‘‘disenchanted’’ or ‘‘re-enchanted’’ at
will. Humans cannot do this. And what kind of god could
do it? It would take a very ‘‘modern’’ god indeed to
reconfigure or ‘‘reset’’ the moral and spiritual status of the
world. Only a man-made artifact like a computer can be
‘‘reset’’, and the world is not our artifact—if it is one at all.
Does this mean that no cultural change is possible, that
our thinking must remain captive? Although technology in
the broad sense outlined above has always been ‘‘perva-
sive,’’ the modern way of thinking and doing is not nec-
essarily pervasive, although for now it is pervasive in the
Western World and also in the Eastern societies, insofar as
they are infused with, and mixed with, modernity. But this
insight by itself can already open up our thinking and
attend us to alternative ways of seeing and doing, allowing
us to be critical of our current vocabulary and thinking.
Consider for example the way we think about informa-
tion and information technology. In our modern language,
we talk about information as if it is a ‘‘standing-reserve’’
(Heidegger 1954). We think it is a resource, which is
available to us and which we can use. We treat information
the way we treat natural or artificial objects, as means for
human purposes. The same goes for the material artifacts
that ‘‘process’’ information. This makes information and
information technology appear as ethically neutral; it
seems to be a mere tool. But by talking about information
in this way, we forget that it can also be regarded as
something that that also changes us and forms us. Since we
are deeply relational, how we think about information and
what we do with information changes our form of human
being and our form of life. If we are not aware of this, it is
because modernity—as a way of thinking and living—is
itself pervasive, has become ubiquitous; it is present in our
thinking, in our activities, and in our objects. It is part of us
and it has shaped what it means to be human. Modern
technology also forms modern subjects. Perhaps we could
say that object and subject ‘‘live’’ in a kind of symbiosis.
We cannot simply end a particular object–subject relation
and the practice that is shaped by it.
At the level of the self, for instance, technologies play
a more significant role than is usually supposed.
Technologies are not only tools and things but always also
what Foucault called ‘‘technologies of the self’’—tech-
niques humans use to understand themselves and which
‘‘permit individuals to effect by their own means or with
the help of others a certain number of operations on their
own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of
being’’ (Foucault 1988, p. 18). But often we do not use
these technologies-as-technologies-of-the-self in a con-
scious way. Although often unintended, the artifacts we use
and design also shape the self. For example, we use social
networks to ‘‘connect’’ to others but at the same time we
constitute our identity.
Moreover, in on-line networks—social and commer-
cial—our constructed identities are already treated as
objects; we are used as data, that is, as a resource, for
commercial purposes. By treating the world as a standing-
reserve, we have become a standing-reserve ourselves. But
the solution is not to reinforce our autonomy, for example,
by claiming privacy rights. If we treat it as a problem
concerning autonomy, we remain in the same kind of
thinking space. Rather, what is problematic and dangerous
are the ‘‘I-phones’’ and the ‘‘I-way of thinking’’ on both
sides of the debate, which exemplify the hyper-individu-
alist modernity that denies its own relational ground. We
risk to become the individuals we always wanted to be; we
the risk absence of connection; we risk death – the death of
the human, the death of the social, and the death of the
spiritual (which amount to the same).
Again, (meta-) technological thinking will not help to
change this situation. Modernity itself is not (entirely)
produced, made by us, but is growing. The question is not
‘‘How can we construct walls against invasion by moder-
nity?’’ or ‘‘How can we expel modernity from our fortified
castle-society?’’ Modernity is us; we are modernity.
The desire to change is also modern, of course, and in
modernity, we still have the desire to relate to the world
and to others. With regard to the latter, consider the ethical
ambiguity and indeed existential tragedy of modern social
networks: their aim is to connect, but at the same time they
threaten relationality (or at least deny it) insofar as they
work as ego-boosters, since they are used as tools to (try)
take distance from others and from the world, indeed to
enact once again the Cartesian drama. In this way, the
means change the end, and both means and end remain
ambiguous. Do we become friends or masters and slaves?
Are others collections of data or fellow travelers? The
technology is ‘‘pervasive’’ in this deeper sense—we
attempt to leave modernity but we remain modern, and this
tension is in our use of technology. What we are is already
pervaded by (late) modernity as a way of thinking and as a
particular way of technological doing. But if we think that
this particular way of thinking and doing is ethically
problematic, there is no easy way to change this; it seems
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that, to some extent at least, we have to live in and with this
tension and this tragedy.
Perhaps we need new myths or re-interpret old myths, to
better understand our predicament. For example, in our
mythology we could replace Prometheus by Narcissus. We
love humanity and we love ourselves; we keep on looking
in the mirror. But in the end, this absence of (real) rela-
tionality means death. Our mirror image does not answer.
If we create technologies that show us what we are but fail
to let us grow and flourish, we are on the wrong track—or
rather we do not move at all. A famous scholar of Con-
fucianism (Wei-Ming 1991) draws attention to the imper-
ative ‘‘renew yourself every day’’. If we want to renew
humanity, we need to renew our relation to technology.
Modernity loves the new, but can it bring forth the new in
such a way that it allows us to move beyond modernity,
beyond itself?
For thinking about AI, this problem implies that we
should think twice before creating entities in our image for
a different reason than suggested by the ‘‘Frankenstein’’
way of framing the problem. We are right to fear the
coming of such robots, but not because they (the artificial
creatures) would necessarily turn against us (the creators)
and punish our hubris, or not even because they would
shock the human ego once again by challenging the idea
that we are radically different from machines, as Mazlish
has argued (Mazlish 1993), since this is yet another version
of the hubris narrative. Rather, we are right to fear such a
future if it means that these robots are indeed created in
imago humani understood socially and historically, that is,
if we would create relations between ‘‘them’’ and ‘‘us’’
that resemble current human relations and forms of life,
since this would recreate the problem of modern society.
Then, we would feel that we need once again a modern
solution to a modern problem; our lives would become
‘‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’’, as Hobbes
described his ‘‘war of every man against every man’’
(Hobbes 1651), unless we would install new sovereigns
(natural or artificial) and give up our initial freedom. But
the modern problem definition is itself flawed since it
denies that we—humans and non-humans—are already
part of a living, social–natural–-artificial whole. If we
keep watching too long in the mirror, we lose sight of the
real.
Today, the largest ‘‘artificial intelligence’’, however, is
not in robots but is right before our eyes: the natural–
artificial whole, the techno–human ecology, has grown into
a World Wide Web and we are part of it. With regard to
this ‘‘hybrid’’ ecology, the better ethical questions are not
‘‘Does it threaten our autonomy?’’ or ‘‘Does it alienate
us?’’—this presupposes that it is external to the human—
but rather ‘‘Can we begin to re-direct its growth’’—that is,
our growth—in a way that produces more flourishing rather
than less? This means: can we change in a way that is more
fruitful than what has grown out of the dry, sterile seeds of
hyper-individualist modernity? Can we do this without
falling into the trap of collectivism, fascism, ‘‘fundamen-
talism’’ and other modernisms and quasi-modernisms? Can
we transform ourselves in a non-modern way, and how,
given that this desire for transformation is typically mod-
ern? The stakes are high; the question about technology is
at the same time the social question, and ultimately, a
‘‘religious’’ or ‘‘spiritual’’ question with a strong normative
side to it: how and to what/to whom can we relate (Lat. re-
ligare; this is the broad meaning of religion assumed in this
essay) and how should we relate?
In order to answer this question, we can try to learn from
the study of non-modern forms of life and from alternative
modernities in the East and elsewhere (see also Eisenstadt
2000 on ‘‘multiple modernities’’). There is no ‘‘pure’’ form
of modernity, not even in the West. And the alternative
modernities we might perceive in the East or elsewhere are
not fixed; they are themselves dynamic and they are
growing into forms we cannot entirely grasp or predict.
Moreover, these forms should not be understood separate
from the West. For example, Chinese culture, like any
other culture, is a ‘‘living reality’’ (Wei-Ming 1991), which
was already impacted by Western modernity in colonial
times and continues to be impacted by it today, and what
grows out of this may in turn influence thinking in the
West. In particular, it may challenge the Western way of
life, including the specific Western way of being-techno-
logical and being-together (without necessarily resulting in
a convergence).
Therefore, the question what it is to be human in this age
of pervasive technology requires us to further reflect not
only on the material, cultural, and spiritual conditions that
form our lives in our society (‘‘wherever’’ that is), but also
on the conditions that shape the lives of people living in
other societies. To stop looking in the mirror of our own
culture implies being open to listen to different stories and
try out different ways of relating. Technologies, cultures,
and societies only become alien if we do no longer engage
with them, and the same is true for our own culture: we
experience our own world as alien if we disconnect, if we
stop breathing. Living means: the world goes through us
and we go through the world. It is to pervade and to be
pervaded. A living culture breaths. But an ethics of life
should not be conceived as a meta-technological modernist
project of regaining control and executing a plan to change
our culture by forcing in a different way of thinking (this
would amount to a kind of ‘‘self-colonization’’). Impa-
tience is perhaps the modern vice. Rather, virtuous cultural
change must be understood and practiced as a way of let-
ting-grow—a growth, a metamorphosis which is at the
same time human, social, technological, and spiritual.
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